The paper re-visits the literature on real rigidities in New Keynesian models in the context of an economy at the zero lower bound. It identi…es strategic interaction among price-and wage-setting agents in the economy as an important determinant of both optimal policy and economic dynamics in deep recessions. In particular, labour market segmentation is shown to have a signi…cant in ‡uence on the length of the forward commitment to keep interest rates at zero, the magnitude of the …scal policy responses as well as in ‡ation volatility in the economy under optimal policy. JEL Classi…cation: E31, E32, E52, E61, E62.
Introduction
Keeping the nominal interest rate at zero even after the natural rate has recovered to positive values, enacting an increase in government spending or, more controversially, introducing tax increases have all been discussed as viable stabilization policy strategies in New Keynesian economies subject to deep recessions. This paper studies the extent to which the desirability of such strategies is a¤ected by the nature of interaction among …rms and households in the product and labour markets. It highlights that both the optimal length of time spent at the zero bound, the strength of policy responses, and the magnitude of observed macroeconomic outcomes under optimal policy (such as in ‡ation rates) are signi…cantly a¤ected by the degree of strategic complementarity in price-and wage-setting. We show that the structure of the labour market (in particular, whether or not labour markets are segmented) has a profound e¤ect on both optimal policy and macroeconomic outcomes.
The importance strategic complementarity between price-or wage-setters has received considerable attention in the context of the ability of New Keynesian models to replicate observed persistence in the real economy following monetary policy shocks. 1 However, the literature on stabilization policy at the zero lower bound has so far largely ignored the implications of strategic interaction in price and wage setting for policy under the speci…c circumstances presented to policy makers by the presence of this nonlinearity. 2 Exploring the interaction between strategic complementarity and optimal policy at the zero lower bound is important, as seemingly innocuous assumptions about market structure or structural parameters often taken in the literature have non-trivial implications 1 See Edge (2002) , Woodford (2003, Chapter 3) or Ascari (2003) , for example. 2 Most recently, Eggertsson and Singh (2016) discuss sector speci…city of labour markets in a paper on zero-lower-bound issues. They concentrate on the analytical usefulness of this assumption, and do not explore the implications for policy or economic dynamics.
for the way we should think about 'good'policy and what is desirable to achieve in terms of outcomes in the economy.
In this paper, we study a New Keynesian setup in which prices and/or wages are sticky, and the labour market can be either non-segmented (or economy-wide) or segmented (sector-speci…c). Government spending is valued and the income tax policy is determined endogenously. This economy is subject to a large fundamental shock as a result of which optimally set nominal interest rates hit the zero lower bound. 3 While Correia et al. (2013) have shown that a su¢ ciently rich set of policy instruments can completely circumvent the liquidity trap problem, and may even enable policy makers to implement the …rst best outcome, in this paper we study a world in which solutions that are costless in welfare terms are ruled out. In addition to setting the tax on wage income and government spending, the authorities can use forward commitment concerning interest rates to stabilize the economy in a liquidity trap. 4 Eggertsson and Woodford (2006) and Nakata (2011) have also studied a simultaneous determination of optimal monetary and …scal policy in a deep recession but did not consider in greater depth the role of wage stickiness and, in particular, strategic complementarities. Christiano et al.
(2009) and Christiano (2010) , whilst including wage stickiness, only examined the functioning of ad hoc (tax) policies and concentrated on the implied real economy e¤ects. 3 The policy prescriptions obtained in our framework are standard given that the source of the downturn in our model is also standard-a shock to the rate of time preference of agents. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013) and Mertens and Ravn (2014) have questioned the usefulness of such conventional policy advice if the cause of the severe downturn in the economy is that expectations are not well-anchored. We believe this discussion is beyond the scope of the intended contribution of this paper. 4 Such a set of policy tools better re ‡ects the policy decisions implemented by central banks and governments around the developed world in the wake of the most recent severe recession. See, for example, European Commission (2009) or Council of Economic Advisers (2010). Only the United Kingdom have on a one-o¤ basis implemented a policy concerning the general VAT rate that is vaguely in line with Correia et al. (2013) .
We …nd that the optimal response in the in ‡ation rate to a given large shock varies by as much as one order of magnitude depending on whether we assume sector-speci…c labour markets or an economy-wide labour market. We also highlight the importance of key parametric assumptions for policy and outcomes at the zero lower bound. In particular, we show that depending on the nature of nominal wage adjustment in the economy, a linear production technology may justify relatively high expected in ‡ation or-at the other extreme-strict pricelevel targeting strategies. The di¤erences are smaller with a concave production function.
Intuitively, in the presence of nominal price and/or wage rigidities (à la Calvo), features that force price-or wage-optimizers to consider more carefully the potential adverse implications of demand reallocations for their pro…ts act to supress relative price adjustment following shocks. It matters, in particular, if real wage changes are seen as an economy-wide phenomenon or something that a¤ects particular industries only. In the latter case, sectoral price determination needs to take into account the consequences of price-change-induced demand re-allocation for sectoral wages (and pro…ts). An implication of this is more caution in price re-optimization, less in ‡ation volatility and more volatility in real variables. The latter is manifested in both larger response magnitudes and longer duration of adjustment following shocks. Such considerations are, understandably, exacerbated by factors such as the intersectoral substitutability of di¤erent types of products and labour, and the nature of the production technology. This is something we demonstrate in the paper too.
The optimal policy response in the presence of conditions for dampened adjustment is to act more forcefully. In terms of monetary policy action, the commitment to keep interest rates at zero lasts longer after the zero bound ceases to bind once real rigidities are taken into account. Krugman (1998) famously argued that monetary policy is not ine¤ective in a liquidity trap as long as it is able to a¤ect in ‡ation expectations. Expectations of higher in ‡ation lower the current real interest rate and act to stimulate demand even if the short-term nominal interest rate is stuck at zero. It has been shown in the context of standard New Keynesian models that the monetary policy consistent with such evolution of prices involves a commitment to keep the nominal interest rate at zero for some time after the zero bound ceases to bind. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , Jung et al. (2005) and Adam and Billi (2006) have shown this formally, whilst arguing for very modest rates of expected in ‡ation. Our paper demonstrates that the optimal duration of the commitment to keep interest rates at zero as well as the implied in ‡ation rates vary considerably depending on the assumed degree of strategic complementarity in price and wage setting decisions. Contrary to what one might expect, longer forward commitment does not translate into larger in ‡ation responses. It merely mitigates their absence. The point of a stronger monetary policy response is primarily to engineer a larger boom in the real economy in the future which reduces desired savings and stimulates demand in the short run. This is consistent with a thought experiment in Werning (2012) who examined the case of a simple economy in a liquidity trap with arti…cially …xed prices. We show that such a simple exercise is a close approximation of optimal dynamics in a sticky-price sticky-wage New Keynesian economy with a linear production technology.
When real rigidities are stronger, other tools in the conventional stabilization toolbox are applied more forcefully too: the desired short-term government spending expansion is larger and the government must commit itself to greater cuts in the future. A policy strategy of 'leaning against the wind'in which government spending is …rst raised and then cut whilst the nominal interest rate is at the zero bound has been proposed by Gertler (2003) due to its impact on the natural rate of interest. Nakata (2011) and Werning (2012) have shown this to be a feature of optimal policy in a liquidity trap. Werning (2012) argues that the mentioned strategy is almost entirely 'opportunistic'and the motivation for it has little to do with stabilization. 5 We provide evidence supporting this view too. Since we study optimal policy from a timeless perspective, in line with Schmidt (2013), we do not …nd large gains in terms of the stability of nominal or real variables as a result of the deployment of government spending.
The idea that an income tax hike is desirable at the zero bound due to its e¤ect on (expected) in ‡ation and the real interest rate has been discussed in Benigno (2009), Eggertsson (2011) and Nakata (2011). In Correia et al. (2013) , tax policy is best thought of as a price stabilization tool given its impact on the marginal cost in the economy. In our model, we also observe gains in price stability once tax policy is activated in addition to the other tools in the policy maker's toolbox.
Overall, the budgetary impact of stabilization measures is close to zero in the short term.
We also examine the state-dependency of our results as in Burgert and Schmidt (2014) . We …nd that higher initial indebtedness tends to amplify the di¤erences across economies with di¤erent labour market structures. In particular, the optimal in ‡ation response is even larger in the economy with economy-wide labour markets relative to the alternatives considered when initial debt is high. Tax policy deployed more forcefully bears the brunt of the initial adjustment in debt. This can be an increase or a cut depending on where the economy starts relative to its steady state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces di¤erent versions of a baseline model that form the basis for our analysis of the design of optimal monetary and …scal policies in a liquidity trap. This model is parameterized and solved using the nonlinear method explained in great detail in Nakata (2011) . The results of the numerical exercise are presented and related to the existing literature in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The model
This section describes a model of an economy with sticky nominal wages and prices akin to Benigno and Woodford (2005) which builds on Erceg et al. (2000) .
The government authorities in our economy set the interest rate, government spending and the distortive labor income tax rate to stabilize the economy. Shocks to the discount factor are the only source of disturbance in the model, and we examine the economy's adjustment under perfect foresight along a deterministic path following a single large innovation to the discount factor. If this innovation was small, it could be fully o¤set by a cut in the nominal interest rate, and other policy instruments would not play a role in stabilizing the economy.
Whilst the model is closer to the widely used medium-scale setups than the more common simple stylized frameworks in terms of its complexity, it should still be thought of only as a relatively tractable environment for the study of policy interactions. The quantitative results from this model are especially subject to this caveat. The main lessons concerning policy coordination should, however, apply more generally, as the circumstances we examine are implicit in all larger-scale models.
The discount factor shock
An exogenous shock to the discount factor of agents, representing a change in their preferences in terms of consumption and savings, is used to capture the idea of a severe demand-led contraction in the economy.
As in Nakata (2011), we assume that the discount factor at time t+s is de…ned as s , i.e. s shows the relative di¤erence between discount factors at time t + s and t + s + 1: The following assumptions about the discount factor shock hold in the model 0 = 1;
The discount factor shock is realized before optimization decisions are made. It holds that " ;1 > 0 and the shock persists, but decays with the time at the rate 0 < < 1:
Households and the labour market
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive households located on the unit interval [0; 1]. Those of type j choose private consumption of a …nal good C t (j) and holdings of one-period risk-free nominal government bond B t (j) to maximize welfare given by
The variable P t is a price of a …nal good, R t stands for the gross nominal return on the bond, while n;t is the labor income tax rate. T LS t refers to the lump sum taxes (transfers) that may be paid by (to) the households. The pro…ts generated by monopolistically competitive …rms are transferred to households in the form of lump-sum dividends D t . This maximization exercise yields the Euler equation
where t = P t =P t 1 is price in ‡ation. The Euler equation is not indexed by the households, as we assume completeness of insurance market against idiosyncratic shocks and that the initial holdings of assets are the same across households. 6 Therefore, C t (j) = C t for all j and t: 7
Households of type j supply a di¤erentiated labor service N t (j) at a wage rate
There is a perfectly-competitive employment agency that aggregates the supplied di¤erentiated labor in an index according to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz
in which " is the elasticity of substitutions between di¤erentiated labour. The perfectly-competitive employment agency sells aggregated labour to producers of …nal goods at an aggregate wage index W t : The agency chooses N t (j) to
, taking the wage rate W t (j) and the aggregate price index W t as given. In optimum, the employment agency's demand for type-j labour is given by
The aggregate wage index is then given by
: 6 An implication of the former is that the exact distribution of shares across …rms does not matter. Hence, we do not specify dividends D in detail. 7 Notice here that if is small enough, it can be fully o¤set by a change in R, leaving the rest of the economy una¤ected.
To introduce wage stickiness, the model assumes a system of staggered wage contract for the households: households of a certain type are able to change their wages with probability 1 w at any given period of time. Whenever the households are allowed to re-optimize their wage, they choose optimal W t to maximize expected discounted sum of utilities, taking into account that they may not be allowed change the wage rate, subject to the demand for labor equation and the budget constraint. For simplicity, we do not consider wage indexation.
The households thus choose the wage rate to maximize
3). This problem gives us the wage setting equation
We have de…ned w t = W t =W t 1 and w t = W t =P t : Given our wage setting mechanism, the evolution of the aggregate wage index follows
Firms
There is a continuum of intermediate di¤erentiated goods indexed i. Firms operating in sector i use a linear production technology to produce output
The representative …nal goods producer that operates in a perfectly competitive environment sells Y t which is an aggregate of Y t (i) according to
in which is the elasticity of substitutions between the di¤erentiated intermediate products.
The representative …nal goods producing …rm sells its product to the consumers at a price P t : It chooses the quantity of each di¤erentiated good to
The aggregate price index is given by
Price adjustment is assumed to be staggered too. It is assumed that in any given period, the intermediate goods producing …rms operating in a given sector are able to re-optimize their price with a probability 1 p : Whenever the …rms are able to re-optimize their price, they choose the optimal P t to maximize expected discounted sum of pro…ts subject to the demand for their product de…ned in equation (2.9). The problem of the …rms is thus
The solution for the optimal price is given by
The dynamic of the aggregate price index follows
(2.14)
Government
Monetary and …scal authorities coordinate their action to maximize social welfare.
The monetary branch of the central government sets the nominal interest rate R t , and is constrained by the zero lower bound
The …scal authority sets the tax rate n;t and decides about government spending G t . The government ‡ow budget constraint tracking the evoution of debt is then
Further equilibrium conditions
Given the intermediate goods producing …rms' production function (2.8), the demand for intermediate goods (2.10), and the labor market clearing condition
stands for price dispersion. The resource constraint is given by
An important equilibrium condition is the identity describing the evolution of real wages in the economy
(2.20)
Chugh (2006) highlights the importance of this identity in generating endogenous persistence in a sticky-price, sticky-wage economy.
Alternative versions of the model
We consider two versions of this model in which wages will be ‡exible but the steady state is the same as in the economy set out above. These versions are distinct in one crucial aspect: labour market segmentation. This has a key implication for the price determination in the economy and ultimately for the degree of sluggishness in the response of the real economy to shocks and policy action.
No labour market segmentation
When intermediate goods producing …rms hire labour from the economy-wide market, their pricing decision still a¤ects the demand for the di¤erentiated goods produced by these …rms but they consider the economy-wide real wage rate as being una¤ected by their decision. This signi…cantly increases the sensitivity of prices to shocks and accelerates real adjustment following disturbances and policy action. This version of the model is the same as the one presented in the sections above with w set to zero and relative wages set to one at all times. In the presence of perfect insurance against idiosyncratic risk, we also need not consider di¤erentiated types of labour and write N t and W t instead of their sector-speci…c values in the households'problem.
Segmented labour markets
In this version of the model, which is close to the setup of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Adam and Billi (2006) , the intermediate goods producing
…rms internalize the consequence of their pricing decision for demand for the speci…c type of good, and the subsequent implications for the sectoral wage rate through the demand for sector-speci…c labour. The …rms'problem gets modi…ed in a fundamental way. We now have …rms choosing the optimal price to maximize
and the de…nition of the real wage rate coming from the household problem. 8 Following Woodford (2003) , by symmetry between i and j, we can write
Equations (2.11) to (2.13) now become
The introduction of sector-speci…city raises questions about wage formation. In order to avoid the need to consider monopsony in the labour market, we are implicitly assuming that there are many …rms and many households in each sector in the economy, i.e. a 'double continuum' of …rms and households, as explained in Woodford (2003, Chapter 3) . Hence, we have used the plural form '…rms'and 'households'of a certain type throughout the text.
The policy problems
We shall consider the alternative versions of the model with di¤erent elements of the policy maker's toolbox switched on and o¤. In all cases, the objective will be to …nd sequences of endogenous variables that maximize an unweighted average of welfare across households
is a measure of wage dispersion. This is equal to one for all t when wages are ‡exible. Moreover, in the case of the ‡exible-wage economy with economy-wide labour markets, the disutility of labour supply is expressed as
We shall be looking for policies that are optimal from a timeless perspective (Woodford, 2003) . In other words, we will be solving for time-invariant policy rules assuming that preferences in the initial period are augmented so that the policy maker does not take advantage of the fact that there had been no expectations formed about the initial outcomes. The equilibrium conditions and the …rst-order conditions for each version of the model are listed in the Appendix.
Parameterization and solution
We parameterize the model with values commonly used in the literature. 9 We refer to the model under this parameterization as our 'baseline'case. The discount factor is assumed to be 0.99. The discount factor shock " ;1 is set to 0.02 to make sure the economy hits the zero bound. The persistence of the innovation is 0.9.
Thus, to determine when the natural rate of interest exceeds zero, one needs to check at what quarter the product of t falls below 1. For the parameters of the shock process, the discount factor and the persistence, the natural rate of interest is above zero from t>7. 10 We assume preferences are logarithmic in government spending, set C to 1/6 and the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply to 1. 11 The preference parameters N;0 and G;0 are set to 1 and 0.2 respectively. This parameterization implies that steady-state government spending is close to 20 percent of steady-state output and the steady-state public debt is at 50 percent of annualized GDP. The elasticity of susbstitution for goods is set to 11. We follow Chugh (2006) in setting the elasticity of substitution in the labour market " to 21. The measure of price stickiness p is 0.75 implying an average four-quarter duration or price contracts. The same value is used to parameterize the duration of wage contracts when wages are sticky. 12 The production function is assumed to be linear in labour in the baseline case (as in Nakata, 2011 or Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2015).
When conducting sensitivity tests, the steady-state of our model is going to change. We maintain comparability by ensuring that in all cases the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio remains at 50 percent of GDP.
Given that we consider an event in which the economy departs far from its steady state, and an inequality constraint becomes binding, we solve the model in its non-linear form. We use the procedure described in detail in Nakata 
Results
There are two ways of dissecting our results. We shall look at comparisons across di¤erent labour market arrangements. At the same time, we can understand a lot about the intuition behind the various policy interventions and the transmission of policy decisions by inspecting the same economy under di¤erent policies and parameterizations. In this section, we draw conclusions from both of these approaches. First, we look at the baseline model. Later, we demonstrate the robustness of our intuition by conducting sensitivity tests.
The model under baseline parameterization
Our …rst set of results is shown in Figure A .1 in which impulse response functions to a discount factor shock for three types of economic settings are compared (a model with ‡exible wages and an economy-wide labour market, a model with ‡exible wages and segmented labour markets labelled 'SLM', and a model with sticky wages). Here, we assume that monetary policy is the only available tool to stabilize the economy and that the …scal solvency constraint is satis…ed through lump-sum taxes.
The model's simulation suggests that the optimal in ‡ation volatility at the zero lower bound is signi…cantly a¤ected by the nature of the labour markets in the economy. When labour market sector speci…city is introduced into the model with ‡exible wages, the optimal in ‡ation response to a given shock drops by as much as one order of magnitude. In the model with sticky wages, in ‡ation volatility drops even further. For all practical purposes, the dynamic of the optimal sticky-wage economy is the same as the dynamic of an economy without price or nominal wage in ‡ation. The …gure also shows that in all three models, it is optimal to keep the nominal interest rate at zero even after the zero bound ceases to bind. This result is in line with the earlier literature. However, our key contribution is to show that it is optimal to keep the interest rate at zero for even longer when labour markets are segmented or nominal wage rigidities are present. This policy-as we demnonstrate-is associated with smaller rather than larger expected in ‡ation in the economy.
The intuition for this result is best understood in the context of the literature that investigates the ability of New Keynesian models to generate realistic degrees of output persistence (Edge, 2002 , Ascari, 2003 , Woodford, 2003 .
Changing the nature of the labour markets a¤ects the way price-setting …rms and/or wage-setting households respond to a demand contraction or expansion in important ways. In a ‡exible-wage economy, a shock with negative implications for demand implies lower demand for labour and hence a downward pressure on real wages (and, by implication, on marginal cost). In an economy with ‡exible wages and economy-wide labour markets, optimizing …rms would re ‡ect the e¤ect on wages to a large extent in their pricing decision. They would consider the fact that they may not be able to change the price soon as demand recovers (and in fact overshoots) which will limit the extent to which prices drop. The …rms also consider that lowering prices induces substitution of demand from goods for which prices remain unchanged. They can, however, recruit additional labour at the prevailing economy-wide real wage rate, which is a cost unrelated to the industry they operate in. With labour market segmentation, the …rms need to consider that price-change-induced intersectoral re-allocation of demand needs to be met by hiring additional labour from a speci…c market with a speci…c wage rate. This will be a¤ected by the need to meet the extra demand. This additional wage e¤ectwhich would eat into …rms' pro…ts-introduces an element of caution in price setting. As a consequence, there is a dampened price response in the …rst place, and a more persistence in the adjustment of the real economy. This mechanism explains the much more subdued in ‡ation dynamic under segmented labour markets as depicted in Figure A The downside of such price stability is that it imples a higher path for real interest rates. In the absence of signi…cant expected in ‡ation, the future real boom would be more subdued ceteris paribus and discounted more heavily. Relatively low wealth implies lower consumption in the short run.
The monetary policy maker mitigates subdued price in ‡ation by keeping the interest rate at zero for longer. This induces a greater real economy boom. It is in this sense that we argue, following Werning (2012) , that monetary policy in the liquidity trap is geared towards generating an expected real economy boom rather than in ‡ation per se.
Overall, we still observe a signi…cantly larger drop in output and consumption under segmented labour markets and nominal wage rigidity than with economywide labour markets. However, an optimizing policy maker will be comfortable with achieving more price stability at the expense of larger consumption (and output) volatility. This is because strategic complementarity a¤ects not only the degree to which marginal cost pressures translate into price movements (the slope of the Phillips curve) but also the relative costliness of in ‡ation and output variability from a welfare perspective. With more strategic complementarity, a ‡atter Phillips curve implies that there is larger misallocation of resources arising from a given rate of in ‡ation.
Introducing government spending as a policy tool does not change the overall picture markedly, which can be inferred from Figure A. 2. This is consistent with Schmidt (2013) . In fact, as argued in Werning (2012), government spending policy may have little to do with stabilization in the economy and instead be driven by public …nance considerations. In an economy with depressed private demand, the marginal disutility of labour is low. An 'opportunistic'policy maker deciding on the optimal amount of public spending within the period following the Samuelson rule will observe a small marginal rate of transformation between the public and private goods (a drop in the relative price of public good), and will seek to increase provision of valued G. The reverse holds in boom time.
To get a feel of the relative contribution of such considerations for government spending policy, we do the following comparison. We take the output dynamic from the optimal economy without …scal variables in use as given, and ask ourselves the question: What would an optimizing policy maker driven purely by public …nance considerations do if he/she saw output dynamic from the economy stabilized only by monetary policy? Our objective is thus to …nd G P F = arg max G (C; C + G; G) with C taken as given. 14 We then compare the result of this exercise with the optimal dynamic of G in the various versions of our New Keynesian economies with tax rates …xed. We report the results in Finally, we add tax policy to our set of policy instruments used to stabilize the economy (see Figure A measures. In our model, taxes lean against the wind: they counteract the dynamic of marginal cost resulting primarily in a more stable in ‡ation rate. This is best seen in the case of the sticky wage economy, as shown in Figure A .5, but the intuition is valid in our ‡exible wage economies as well. In a sticky-wage economy, with only a fraction of wage-setters reacting to tax policy (a¤ecting the net gains from employment), tax policy needs to act more robustly to achieve the desired aggregate outcome.
The overall budgetary impact of stabilization measures is close to zero initially and public debt gradually falls towards a new lower steady state level. It is a feature of the model that there is a continuum of steady states indexed by tax rates with a corresponding debt level. As in Nakata (2011), the welfare-maximizing tax rate is negative (eliminating the distortions to the steady state), and the corresponding steady state features a higher output level, more government spending and government holding net assets. Following the shock, the economy moves into a steady state located closer to such an outcome. 15 
Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of our results to parameters that determine the degree of strategic complementarity in the economy. By looking at parameters that drive the extent to which (downward) marginal cost pressures arising from the a shock with severe demand implications are re ‡ected in priceand wage-setting decisions of optimizing …rms and households, we can verify if the intuition set out in the previous section is correct. Finally, we check how the results are a¤ected if the economy has an inherited public debt level signi…cantly above and below the steady-state level. 16 15 The optimal debt dynamic would likely di¤er in a model with a di¤erent role for government expenditures, given that the zero-rate interest policy would likely a¤ect public sector investment decisions, for example, were they included in the model. Nevertheless, the model is relevant for real-world considerations in the sense that it shows that stabilization and reduction of debt levels towards a lower e¢ cient level can go hand in hand. 16 The results are quite predictably sensitive to parameters driving nominal rigidity. When the degree of wage stickiness is lowered (from four to two quarters on average), in ‡ation volatility increases somewhat, and real volatility drops. Also, interest rates are kept at zero for only one period longer than otherwise (two periods in the baseline calibration). However, the main intuition still holds, and the quantitative impact is moderate.
The link between the shape of the production function and strategic complementarity is subtle. When the production function is no longer linear, changes in the amount of labour are no longer proportional to the changes in demand for production. Even in a non-segmented labour market, a pro…tmaximizing price setter has to consider the situation that his production costs will be more-than-proportionately a¤ected if additional demand comes his way as a result of re-setting prices, whilst others keep theirs unchanged. This, again, introduces caution into the price setting. As a consequence, we observe reduced price volatility and increased output response in the economy with a nonsegmented labour market. The peak of the in ‡ation response drops by almost a half of what it was with a linear production function and the time spent at the zero bound lengthens in this economy to 10 periods versus the 9 periods in the baseline version (see Figure A.6 ). This result con…rms that real rigidity-whether induced by a particular labour market structure or other factors such as the shape of the production function-is an important determinant of the magnitude of the desired in ‡ation response to shocks at the zero bound, and the time spent at the zero lower bound.
Somewhat counterintuitively, in the sticky-wage model, in ‡ation volatility increases moderately when production function is modelled to be concave.
In ‡ation now behaves similarly to the economy with segmented labour markets.
The reason for this dynamic can be traced back to what happens in the labour market in the ‡exible price and wage version of our economy. The natural level of output in the economy is determined as the intersection between labour supply and labour demand functions in a (Y; w) plane (equations (2.4) and (2.11) with the left-hand sides equal to one and the 's equal to zero). With a linear production function, the demand function is horizontal at a level determined by the steady-state markup. The labour supply function is upward sloping. If a shock a¤ects labour supply, the equilibrium (natural) real wage rate will stay una¤ected.
With a concave production function, labour supply still slopes upwards. The labour demand schedule, however, becomes downward sloping in the (Y; w) plane.
Marginal cost now depends on the quantity of production and the equilibrium real wage rate thus must fall when output (labour supply) increases.
In the full version of the model, it is a feature of our economy that a future boom is generated to stabilize the economy in the short term. In this boom, labour supply needs to expand, and real wages need to fall as they loosely track the natural rate. A mild in ‡ation facilitates this adjustment. This is shown in Figure A 
Degree of competition
With lower substitutability across sectors, one would expect strategic complementarity to play a smaller role in the price setting decision. Firms should not be wary of bold moves, as sizeable demand shifts from or to sectors where prices are not re-optimized happen less easily. If our story about strategic complementarity is true, we should expect larger swings in in ‡ation, smaller volatility in real variables, and a shorter time spent at the zero lower bound. Figure A.8 con…rms the intuition. It shows that the optimal economy with a concave production function reverts back towards our baseline model with linear production technology in terms of policies and outcomes once the degree of competition (elasticity of subsitution in the goods market) is lowered. 17 The shape of the production function may indeed be one of the main contributing factors to the opposite …ndings concerning optimal in ‡ation volatility by Chugh (2006).
Other parameters
In addition to the parameters reported above, we also checked the sensitivity with respect to the elasticity of substitution in the labour market " and the elasticity of labour supply (the inverse of which is N;1 ): The results con…rm the intuition conveyed above but in comparison with the analysis of di¤erent forms of the production function, the sensitivity to changes in the elasticity was less pronounced for plausible values of parameters. This is consistent with Ascari (2003) who makes a similar point.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution C a¤ects the model in a variety of ways, making sensitivity tests less straightforward. It a¤ects the transmission of the shock and monetary policy in the model, and the wealth e¤ect of labour supply (and hence the slope of the Phillips curve). A shock of a given magnitude has smaller real consequences as before and policy action has to be more forceful to have impact. In our sensitivity analysis, we have increased the magnitude of the shock so that the depth of the contraction is similar to the one observed in the ‡exible-wage economy non-segmented labour markets above. The key messages from our paper survive this modi…cation. The di¤erences across speci…cations, however, become relatively small both in terms of policy and outcomes. Hence, we conclude that the characterization of what constitutes 'good'policy in a New Keynesian setup at the zero lower bound is most robust when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively small. 18 
Initial level of debt
Burgert and Schmidt (2014) demonstrated that inherited debt level matters for both monetary and …scal policy at the zero lower bound. We examined the state-dependency of dynamics in our baseline economy by considering the following two cases. In the 'high debt'scenario, the initial level of public debt was set at twice the steady-state level of debt, i.e. at 100 percent of GDP. In the 'low debt' scenario, the inherited indebtedness was half of the steady-state level of debt.
As in Burgert and Schmidt (2014) , we …nd that the magnitude of the in ‡ation response is increasing, the initial increase in government spending is falling, and the initial response in the tax rate is increasing in the level of inherited debt. Their conclusions obtained under discretionary policy thus carry over into an economy with time-consistent policy of the 'timeless perspective'type. In line with much of the New Keynesian literature (see, for instance, Benigno and Woodford, 2004 or Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe, 2004), the initial deviation of debt from its steady-state level is never fully undone. 19 This is a manifestation of intertemporal smoothing of welfare in tax and government spending policy.
As regards the interaction between the initial level of debt and labour market structure, our results show that higher initial indebtedness tends to amplify the di¤erences observed across economies with di¤erent structures when it comes to in ‡ation volatility, in particular. In the economy with non-segmented labour markets, a larger in ‡ation response (a deeper fall in the real interest rate)-the consideration behind which is to a great extent …scal (directly and indirectly through the tax rate)-enables a smoother adjustment in real variables. In line with that, government spending barely moves (there is a slight contraction).
Overall, as shown in Figure A .9, we see debt level falling well below its initial level, and stabilizing at a level that is much higher than the calibrated steadystate level.
Conclusions
We have shown that the optimal length of the forward commitment concerning interest rates at the zero bound and key outcomes such as the magnitude of expected in ‡ation or the depth of the recession under optimal policy depend crucially on the assumed degree of real rigidity in the model. In addition to simple parametric assumptions, more fundamental structural assumptions about the nature of the labour market play an important role in this regard. Labour market segmentation and the presence of staggered wage adjustment were shown to have particularly signi…cant consequences for the type of policy one might wish to implement in an economy hit by a large shock that depresses demand. In those circumstances, it is a good idea for governments to lean against the wind in two di¤erent ways. First, an increase in government spending when output is low (and vice versa) stabilizes output (and prices) but this policy can be justi…ed almost wholly with reference to static public …nance considerations. Second, an increase in taxes when output is low (and vice versa) stabilizes prices via their impact on marginal cost. The results interact in interesting ways with the initial conditions in the economy. With higher inherited debt, …scal sustainability considerations matter more for monetary and tax policy and the explained di¤erences across market structures grow larger.
The emphasis in the paper is on theory and intuition. Nevertheless, it should be of interest to modellers working with medium-scale models in which sticky wages are a standard feature. Di¤erent estimations of such models often yield diametrically di¤erent parameter estimates. Our paper highlights that such shifts in parameter values need not be inoccuous modi…cations of the setup but may require a di¤erent way of thinking about policy, particularly at the zero lower bound.
There is a lot more work to be done in the broadest sense to build better models to study economic cycles and their welfare consequences. The smallest departure from the present setup would be to have a model with a better account of the welfare costs of unemployment or …nancial market failures. Nevertheless, our paper allows the reader to have a better understanding of how market structures matter for macroeconomic policy and outcomes. shock to the discount factor 0:02 persistence of the shock 0:90
A. Appendix

A.1. Figures and Tables
A.2. Optimality conditions
This section lists the equilibrium conditions de…ning the evolution of the optimal economy under the various scenarios we consider. 20 When …scal policy instruments are held constant, the respective …rst-order condition from the Ramsey problem is replaced by an equation that holds the value of the variable constant at its initial steady-state level. Moreover, when nominal interest rates are the only tool used, we assume that lump-sum taxes are available to satisfy the solvency constraint.
The conditions are time-invariant due to the fact that we automatically include the terms that appear as a result of the penalty terms added to the objective function under the timeless perspective approach. Such penalty terms summarize 20 The !'s are Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints of the Ramsey problem. A.2.1. Flexible wage economy
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